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PEOPLE

v.

BEARD

[46 C.2d

2 of section 836 of the Penal Code, as it appears that the
petitioner Badillo had committed and was committing a
felony at the time of his arrest; that the search was an incident of his lawful arrest and was therefore reasonable, and
not in violation of the constitutional guarantee against "unreasonable searches and seizures''; that the evidence obtained
by such search was therefore properly admitted upon the
preliminary hearing; and that petitioner's motion to set aside
the information upon the ground that the evidence was obtained by an alleged "unreasonable" search and seizure was
properly denied by the trial court.
I would therefore discharge the alternative writ of prohibition and deny the peremptory writ.
Shenk, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied :Ylarch 21,
1056. ShC'nk, .J., and Spence, J., \Yere of the opinion that
the petition should be granted.

[Crim. No. 5809.

In Bank.

Feb. 24, 1956.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. ALFRED LEONZA BEARD,
Appellant.
[1] Searches and Seizures-Presumptions.-Where no evidence is
presented for the purpose of determining whether or not officers had reasonable cause for making an arrest and searching
defendant's automobile, it must be presumed that the arrest
and search were justified.
[2] Arrest--Making Arrest.-Where the trial court found that
defendant was arrested while engaged in commission of the
offense charged, there was no violation of Pen. Code, § 841,
requiring the person making an arrest to inform the person
to be arrested of the intention to arrest him, the cause of
his arrest and the authority to make it, except when the person
to be arrested is actually engaged in the commission of or
attempt to commit an offense.
[1] See Cal.Jur., Searches and Seizures, § 2 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Searches and Seizures, § 6 et seq.
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Arrest, § 21 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Searches and Seizures, § 1; [2]
Arrest, §13; [3] Criminal Law, §970(4).
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Law-New Trial-Newly Discovered Evidence.·-lt
a husc of diseretion to deny defendant a new trial
of newly discovered evidence where there was
that dt~fendant's forrrwr attorney eould not have
a potential witness subpoenaed had his t(estimony been
ted ;Jt the tri11l and no ~lwwing: why another witness, who
near the scene of the arrest, could not be located and
uu•:u<Lcu or why the same investigation to locate her after
trial would not have succeeded had r<"asonable diligence
]j,,en used earlier, and where neither def<'ndant's nor his new
affidavit stated facts indicating that failure to
dbtain the evidence presented was owing to any lack of diliof the former attorney.

from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
County and from an order denying a new trial.
L. Ambrose, ,Judge. Affirmed.
for illegal possession of marijuana.
of conviction affirmed.

Judgment

H. J.1e>vis and E. V. Cavanaugh for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, William E. James,
:Marvin Gross and Joan D. Gross, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Respondent.
'i' RAYNO I{, ,J.-By information defendant was charged
\rirlJ one count of possessing marijuana (Health & Saf. Code,
§1
, and one prior misdemeanor conviction of the same
offense. .1\. jury trial 1vas waived, and by stipulation the
's case was submitted on the transcript of the
iminary hearing. Defendant trstified in his own behalf.
Ht• was found gnilty and sentenced to the state prison for
tlw term prescribed by law. He appeals from the judgment
and from the order denying his motion for a new trial.
Officer Buckner of the r,os Angeles Police Department
trstified that shortly after noon on September 17, HJ54, he
another officrr were dri \'ing north on l\Iaple A venue when
observed defendant and a friend of his named Fortier
west on 29th Street. Defendant was driYing. The
offieers overshot 29th Street, 1vent around the block and
came baek on 29th Street approaching Maple Avenue from
the: west. 'rhey obserYed defendant's car parked ahead of
ib,·m. Defendant and Fortier thrn started driving down the
sheet to1yard the officers' car, [mel when they had gone about
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side
the front seat, and
found in one of defendant's
accused the officers of "planting
the area near the place
and inside a fence
in wax paper.*
for Fortier at his home
'''"nmr•nn by the officers. He
so that Fortier could buy
the corner, and defendant also got out of the
He did not see the officers find a
his car, and neither of them showed him the
Officer Buckner testified >vas found in the car,
not know that there was any marijuana cigarette
in his car. He worked as a janitor and had left his car open
on various occasions.
was found
defendant secured new counsel
for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered
§ 1181, subd. ( 8).) He presented
evidence.
aftldaYits
Fortier and a person who lived near the scene
of the
and each affiant stated that he had observed
the search of the car and that neither officer had found a
in the car. He also filed an affidavit in
that he was personally unable to secure
the evidence before the trial because he was in custody. His
new counsel filed an affidavit stating that he had no knowledge
as to
defendant's witnesses were not produced at his trial.
Defendant contends that the officers did not have reasonable cause to believe that he had committed a felony and
that therefore his arrest and the search of his automobile
This case was tried before the decision in People
44 Cal.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905], no evidence was
for the purpose of determining whether or not
officers had reasonab1e cause for making an arrest, and
silent on this question. In People v.
265 [294 P.2d 21], we held that under
it must be presumed that the arrest was
*The committing magistrate refused to admit these cigarettes in
evidence on the ground that they had not been sufficiently connected with
and the trial eourt stated that he did not consider the testi·
officer concerning them in finding defendant guilty.
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verdict has been rendered
the court may,
in the following cases
new t~vidence is discovered
the decould
with rcnsonab1c
at the triaL .
"
42 Cal.2d
4it2
ont that a motion for a new
sound discretion of the trial
:md t1mt "The
of the standard by which
trinl court m its dismay properly grant a new trial on the
of
discovered evidence are set forth in
243 [15 P.
. At page 2'17 it is stated that 'it must
'L That the
and not
be newly discovere\1; 2. 'l'hat thr
8. That it be sueh
to

at the trial ; and 5.
rviclencP
;Ylli('h Hw
aml
of one or more of llle
c•r.-alJ rn ]c;.; 1mn' wi 1h:·d ood the test
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state the existing law. (See People v. Richard, 101 Cal.App.
2d 631,635-636 [225 P.2d 938].)" (42 Cal.2d at 433.)
[3] In the light of the foregoing rules it cannot be said
that the trial court abused its discretion in this case. Thus,
Fortier was present in defendant's car at the time of the
arrest and search and was also charged with a violation of
Health and Safety Code, section 11500, which charge was
dismissed at the preliminary hearing. Obviously defendant
was aware that Fortier was a potential witness, and it is not
claimed that his former attorney could not have had him
subpoenaed had his testimony been wanted at the trial.
Similarly there is no showing as to why the other witness
could not be located and subpoenaed. She lived near the
scene of the arrest, and the trial court could reasonably infer
from the fact that she was close enough to observe the search,
that defendant was aware of her presence at the time. Although, while he was in custody, defendant could not personally locate this witness, there is no showing why the same
investigation made to locate her after the trial would not
have succeeded had reasonable diligence been used earlier.
Moreover, although defendant now contends that he should
not be penalized for any lack of diligence on the part of
his former attorney, neither his nor his present attorney's
affidavit states facts indicating that the failure to obtain the
evidence now presented was owing to any lack of diligence
of the former attorney. Defendant does not state that he
informed his former attorney that bystanders witnessed the
search, that he requested that she attempt to locate such
witnesses, or that she refused to make any attempt to secure
witnesses in his behalf. Under these circumstances the trial
court could reasonably conclude that defendant had not shown
that the decision to rely solely on his own testimony was
other than his own, or that the evidence now presented was
evidence "which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have
discovered and produced at the trial.'' (Pen. Code, § 1181,
subd. (8).)
The judgment and order are affirmed.
Gibson, C.•J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J.,
concurred.
Shenk, J., concnrred in the judgment.
CARTER, ,J.-I dissent.
Since the fads of this case with respect to the reasonableness of the seareh are quite similar to those in the ease of

r'
l!J3f1 I

P~:OPI.~; V. BEARD
14G C.2d 278;

2~14

P.2d 291

\ .1/rtrlin. ( 'rin1. ;)/;)/'\. 1/Jifr, p. ]()!; I 2~):{ J'.~d :-1:2].
to my dis:;rni". in t ltai ,·asP as :w ex
of' my
011 ihe Jaw applic·able j(J ihe ease al h<ll'.
i'llere is anotiH'r rensmt wl1y l mmld n•,·pr:-;r~ ihe judglllcnt
1·asro at bat· \\llir·h is not llll'lllioln•d in my dis:-;ent in
artiu ease, snpm. c\s pointed cmr in the
opinion

the ease at bar. thi;;. ease \ras tried before the deeision
:his eourt in People

Y.

44 Cal.~d 434

P.2d

. aml therefme tl11• trial eourt (1id not Jwye before it
iakc into consiclel'ation the rule annomwed in the Cahan
·with respect to the admissibility of illegally obtained
lenee. Neither did the trial ('OUrt haye or:casion to pass
np"n the reaso11ablcness of the seareh and seizure as this
fador was not considered material nncler the rule and prae\rhidl existed prior t n i he dec·ision of this eourt in the
(';ll:un ease. For this reason \re do not haye the benefit of
1l1(' finding- of the trial eonrt on the question of whether or
1101
he officers vdlO eondneted the sc"arch here had reasonable
c·auc;e to believe that clefeuchmt hall eommitted a felony or
,, <h r·Jlgaged in the eommission of a felony at the time of
1 ile seareh. \Vhile it is my opinion, that on the reeonl before
11s. 110 reasonable canse is shmYn for the seareh of the delhlllant, and it must therefore be declared to be an illegal
it may be that if the ease agaim:t the defendant was
proseentL~d in the light of ·what ·was said by this eourt
Jl! the Cahan case and rases whieh have followed that ease,
thr proseeution wonld no doubt offer any eYidenee available
fnr the purpose of showing the reasonableness of the seareh
<11:'1 the trial court \Yonld necessarily make a finding on this
i~:,\te in ruling 011 the mlmissibility of the eYiclenr:e obtained
the result of the seardl. If there \Yas a eonflict in the
cYidenee on this issue, 1n~ 1Yonl1l be honnd by the finding
o!' ilte trial eonrt the same as we should be bonncl by sueh a
finding in any other ease.
I ean see no jnstifieation whatsoen·r for tl1e holding of
majority in this <·ase that the eYi1lence as a matter of
shmYs that the offieers had reasonable grounds to believe
defendant hacl committe([ or \\·as engaged in the comHlission of a felony at the time they made the seal'eh and
~~'lZllre here inYolYed, but on the contrary it appears from
face of the record that the only condusion that can be
rl:·awn is that the officers had no eause whateYrr to believe
defr•Jvlant llad eommitted or \YHR engaged in the eommission

L

No. 5779.

In Bank.

]'eb.
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v. ANTHONY CITRINO,
Criminal Law- Appeal
criminal case was tried before
Court's decision
44 Cal.2d
282 P.2d 905, defendant
from raising on appeal the question that
obtained evidence was admitted against him though
not
to the admissibility of the evidence at the
trial.
[2] Searches and

the record is
premises and defendant's automobile had a search warrant and there is no eviillegality of the search, it must be presumed
dence
that the officers regularly and lawfully performed their duties.
Civ. Proc., § 1963, subds. 1, 15, 33.)
Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless Error-Evidence.-Where
could have testified to the
of a conditional
the house that was
sales contract without removing it
searched and thus could have shown defendant's ownership
of the automobile in question, he was not prejudiced by
admission of the contract in evidence.

Searches and
§ 2 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
§ 6 et seq.
References: [1] Criminal
§ 1079; [2] Searches
and
§1
Criminal Law, § 1382; [4] Criminal Law,
§ 393(2);
Burglary,
25, 26; [6-8] Burglary, § 40; [9] Witnesses, § 135(4); [10] Criminal Law, § 1377(1); [11] Criminal
Law,§ 589; [12] Criminal Law,§ 1407(9).

